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A NEW AND IMPROVED ENERGY REALITY-IT'S
NO PIPEDREAM: STREAMLINING PERMITTING
PROCEDURES FOR CERTAIN CLASSES OF NATURAL
RESOURCE PROJECTS: THE CANADA-UNITED STATES
KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE
Daniel Hare
In this paper I propose an original policy solution to the
complicated issue of permitting and regulatory review for cross-border
natural resource projects to allow for a smoother quicker approval process
for certain ipes o/projects. I have spec/iycally designed this new procedure
so as tofocus on political compromise and minimize political partisanship,
wile instead concentrating on achieving results. By modi ing the current
regulatory standard to a more streamlined model, deserving cross-border
natural resource projects can swiftly gain approval, yet environmental,
economic, foreign policy, national securit), and other significant concerns
will still receive the attention and thorough evaluation they require.
The paper suggests tvo main changes to the current cross-border
natural resource project permitting system. First, my modified standard
Would use a hybrid permitting scheme, incorporating elements from the
Department ofState s cross-border oil pipeline permitting process and the
Department of Energy less complex cross-border power transmission
line model. Second, three valid methods would be available for gaining
approval for a permit: (1) permit issued based on a favorable decision of
Executive or Secretary ofState; (2) permit issued after earning a minimum
two-thirds vote in both the House of Representatives and Senate; or (3)
permit issued on a state-by-state basis, unless the federal government
department responsible for permitting can prove that the project, as a
Iwhole, is against the national interest. However the scope of this modified
standard would be limited in that it would only be available for natural
resource projects coming from a country with equivalent or superior
(stricter) environmental and natural resource lawIs. The paper concludes
with a short case study that applies the new and improved permitting
scheme to the Keystone XL Pipeline project.
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"The price of oil [is] set by the global market. And
that means every time there 1 tensions that rise in the
fiddle East which is what happening right now-
so will the price of gas. [. j Now, that s not the
future that we want. We don't want to be vulnerable
to something that s happening on the other side ofthe
world somehow affecting our economy, or hurting a
lot offolks who have to drive to get to work. That
not the future I want for America. That's not the
future I want for our kids. I want us to control our
own energy destiny. "-Barack Obama, President of
the United States'
" he United States currently imports more
than half of the oil it consumes, often from countries
hostile to United States interests or with political
and economic instability that compromises supply
security. [ . .j Continued development of North
American energy resources, including Canadian
oil, increases domestic refiners'access to stable and
reliable sources of crude and improves certainty of
fuel supply ... "
-United States House of Representatives Bill 2
INTRODUCTION
For as much partisan bickering as it seems goes on in
Washington, D.C. these days, the basic premise that American
energy security is desirable and an important policy objective cuts
across party lines to garner support from all sides. Yet, while the
ends represent an area of agreement and common ground, as with so
IBarack Obama, President of the United States, Energy Speech in Cushing, Okla-
homa (Mar. 22, 2012), http://",www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/03/22/
obamasenergyspeech in cushingoklahoma 113597.html. The President is a
Democrat.
2 North American-Made Energy Security Act, H.R. 1938, 112th Cong. § 2(1), (4)
(2011), available at http://xNww.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hrl938/text. The
bill was passed by the Republican-controlled House of Representatives.
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many issues, it is the means of reaching those ends that cause dispute
and sow discord. For a vivid (and on-going) example, one need look
no further than the Keystone XL debate that has exploded over
the past couple of years-should the pipeline be granted a permit
to proceed or not? This paper advocates solving that admittedly
complicated problem with a multifaceted approach that develops a
fast-tracked regulatory scheme for specific classes of natural resource
projects. It proposes that in certain types of cases, the pernitting
procedures for cross-border oil pipelines should be modified (eased)
from their current standard to a new, streamlined standard so as
to offer a smoother path to approval for deserving projects. First,
the improved, streamlined standard would use a hybrid permitting
scheme, incorporating elements from the Department of State's
cross-border oil pipeline pernitting process and the Department
of Energy's less complex cross-border power transmission lines
model. Second, three valid methods would be available for gaining
approval of a pernit: (1) a pernit would be issued based on decision
of the Executive or the Secretary of State: (2) a permit would be
issued after earning a minimum two-thirds vote in both the House
of Representatives and the Senate; or (3) a permit would be issued
on a state-by-state basis, unless the federal government department
in charge of permitting could prove that the project, as a whole, was
against the national interest. However, the scope of this modified
standard would be limited in that it would only be available for
natural resource projects coming from countries with equivalent or
superior (stricter) environental and natural resource laws.
This paper will be divided into three main parts. Part II will
overview the current regulatory landscape and permitting procedures
for cross-border oil (liquid) pipelines under the Department of
State. Part III will present the proposed new, streamlined permitting
standard in detail. Finally, Part IV will examine the Keystone XL
pipeline as a case study and apply my new permitting standard in
Compare Editorial, Our view: Allow Keystone oilpipeline expansion, USA TODAY,
Mar. 17, 2011, http://,www.usatoday.cominews/opinion/editorials/2011-03-18-edi-
toriall 8 ST N.htm with Ted Turner (Special CNN Editorial), Stop Keystone pipe-
line before its too late, CNN, Feb. 24, 2012, litip://xNww.cnn.com/2012/02/22/opin-
ion/turner-keystone-pipeline/index.hitm.
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the Keystone XL context. This will encompass a comparative study
of American and Canadian environmental and natural resources
laws, with a focus on the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA) 4 and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
(CEAA).
I. THE CURRENT REGULATORY LANDSCAPE (PERMITTING
STANDARD & PROCEDURES) FOR CROSS-BORDER (LIQvID) OIL
PIPELINES
The responsibility for granting or denying permits for
natural resource- and energy-related facilities that cross one of the
United States' international borders generally falls to one of three
different go overnment entities. Liquid resource pipelines, such as
oil pipelines, are handled by the Department of State's Office of
International Energy and Commodity Policy. 6 Natural gas pipelines
are governed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). Still another agency, the Department of Energy, is in
charge of cross-border power transmission line permitting.' Each of
the above regulators enforces a separate set of permitting procedures
and criteria with which permit-seekers must comply.
442 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (2006).
1992 S.C., c. 37 (Can.) (current as to Mar. 6, 2012).
6Exec. Order No. 11423 (1968), 33 Fed. Reg. 11741 (Aug. 16, 1968), as amended
by Exec. Order No.12847 (1993), 58 Fed. Reg. 29511 (May 20, 1993) & Exec.
Order No. 13337 (2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 25299 (May 5, 2004). The Department of
State also has permitting authority over cross-border facilities for exportation or
importation of coal, minerals, and water, among other substances, as well as land
transportation installations like bridges. Id. "Executive Order" will be hereinafter
abbreviated as "E.O."
7Industries >Natural Gas > Commission's Responsibilities, FERC, Apr. 13, 2012,
http:// xww.ferc.gov/industries/gas.asp (Among other responsibilities, FERC is re-
sponsible for "oversight of the construction and operation of pipeline facilities at
U.S. points of entry for the import or export of natural gas.")
I E.O. No. 8202 (1939), amended by E.O. No. 10485 (1953) and E.O. No. 12038
(1978). The idea that one single entity, such as FERC (under the Department of
Energy rather than the Department of State), should take the lead in regulation of
permitting for all cross-border energy and natural resource facilities is a valid point
with powerful arguments standing behind it. However, it is another problem in and
of itself and, therefore, beyond the scope of this paper.
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The Office of International Energy and Commodity Policy,
on behalf of the Secretary of State and President of the United
States, "receive[s] all applications for permits for the construction,
connection, operation, or maintenance, at the borders of the United
States, of: (i) pipelines ... and similar facilities for the exportation or
importation of petroleum [and] petroleum products . .. to or from a
foreign country."' Once the Secretary of State receives a completed
application, he/she has the power to "request additional information
needed from the applicant, as appropriate."" Executive Order 13337,
issued under the George W. Bush administration, then instructs
the Secretary of State to consult with the Secretaries of Defense,
Interior. Commerce, Transportation, Energy, Homeland Security,
the Attorney General, and the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency," with the option-though not the obligation-
to confer with other federal government departments or agencies"
as well as "State, tribal, and local government officials and foreign
governments as the Secretary deems appropriate....
After reviewing the views of the other officials listed above,
the Secretary of State is finally directed to consider, "in light
of any statutory or other requirements or other considerations"
any "additional information . . . needed in order to evaluate the
application."1 4 The Secretary then makes an overall decision
revolving around the ultimate question of whether "the issuance of a
9E.O. No. 13337, supra note 6, at § 1(a). E.O. No. 11423's language added on a
qualifier of deference to the Congress: the "construction, connection, operation, or
maintenance, at the borders of the United States, of facilities for the exportation or
importation of petroleum, petroleum products ... to or from a foreign country, to
the extent that congressional authorization is not required." E.O. No. 11423, supra
note 6, at § 1(a).
10E.O. No. 13337, supra note 6, at § 1(b)(i).
" Id. at § 1(b)(ii).
1Id. at § 1(b)(iii).
1Id at § 1(e).
14 Id. at § 1(f), (g), (h) (emphasis added). The Department of State will also in-
vite public comment on the permit being reviewed and "consider[ ] all views ex-
pressed, including public comment, before making a decision on a permit." BURLAU
OF WESTERN HENnSPEIRE AFFAIRS-DEPARTMIENT OF STATE, FACT SHEET: APPLYING FOR
PRESIDENTIAL PERITS FOR BORDER CROSSING FACILITIES (CANADA) (Jan. 21, 2009),
http://www.state.gov p/whairls/fs/2009/114990.htm.
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permit ... would serve the national interest. "1 The national interest
determination "involves the consideration of many factors, including
energy security; environmental, cultural, and economic impacts:
foreign policy; and compliance with relevant federal regulations."' 6
Logically enough, if a pennit i ould serve the national interest,
the Department of State will grant it; if a permit would not serve
the national interest, it is denied." The Secretary of State is also
empowered to attach specific conditions to any approved permits
"as the national interest may in the Secretary's judgment require.""
The contents of an application for a cross-border oil pipeline
permit are, as one might expect for any large-scale multinational
project, quite wide-ranging. The main components of a complete
application package-this list is specifically focused onUnited States-
Canada permits-include: identifying information;" a description of
the facility to be constructed.20 an explanation of how the proposed
project will advance the national interest;2 1 identification of already-
existing similar facilities;2 information on the project's impact on
traffic flow (likely inapplicable to most oil pipeline projects); a
Id. at § 1(g), (h), (i) (emphasis added). In the event that there is a dissenting voice
from one of the officials listed in note 11 & accompanying text supra, the final per-
mitting decision goes to the President.
6U.S. Department of State-Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs, Executive Sunnary: Final Environmental Impact Statement
for the Proposed Keystone XL Project ES-1 (2011) [hereinafter Executive Summa-
r}y: Keystone XL EIS].
"E.O. No. 13337, supra note 6, at § 1(g), (h).
'Id. at § 1(g).
19Applying for Presidential Permits for Border Crossing Facilities (Canada), supra
note 14. (This includes precise information that identifies the party applying for a
permit and which will be responsible for the facility's operation.)
20Id. (The applicant must provide the proposed project's "location, design, the safe-
ty standards to be applied, access routes, and details of the proposed construction
methods" as well maps and photographs of the site).
21 Id. (The applicant should support its national interest assertion with documenta-
tion "indicating the desirability and feasibility of the proposed facility").
22 Id.
23 Id.
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detailed construction plan24 financing information;25 "a description
of all steps that have been or will be taken to secure the approval
of local, provincial, and federal officials in Canada:"26 information
about "foreseeable environmental impacts of the proposed facility
pursuant to NEPA;" infonation on other approvals being sought
in the United States:" effects the project might have on preserved
historic properties;29 and environmental justice compliance."o
Generally, the most time- and effort-intensive component
of these application materials is the comprehensive environmental
review, as per NEPA, which must be undertaken before any permits
are issued' The environmental review stage also ends up being a
frequent stumbling block and point of contention for projects seeking
permit approval (see, e.g., Keystone XL). While State Department
NEPA regulations, which adhere closely to the Council on
241 Id. This includes not only a construction plan, but an approximate schedule for
the project's progress and a list of anticipated problems that might be faced during
construction.
25 Id.
261d.
271d.
28Id.
29Id. See National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006). The
Act requires consideration of "the effects of the proposed facility on ... properties
[that are or could potentially be classified in the National Register of Historic Prop-
erties] and seek comment from the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, an
independent federal agency established under the [Act]."; Applying for Presidential
Permits for Border Crossing Facilities (Canada), supra note 14.
Applyingfor Presidential Pernitsfor Border Crossing Facilities (Canada), supra
note 14. See E.O. No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994) (requiring federal
government agency oversight to address the "disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on
minority populations and low-income populations in the United States"). This con-
cept is often referred to as "environmental justice."
' To that point, CEQ's NEPA regulations suggest that final EIS's normally be lim-
ited to 150 pages, but for "proposals of unusual scope or complexity" EIS's should
normally be less than 300 pages. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.7 (2012). The Keystone XL
Pipeline's final EIS is not available online, but a total of three drafts were produced
over a period of nearly three years. Executive Summary: Keystone XL EIS, supra
note 16, at ES-1.
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Environmental Quality's (CEQ) NEPA regulations,3 2 do not identify
any particular federal actions" that by their very nature trigger the
requirement for an environmental impact statement (EIS), 34 oil
pipelines are specifically listed as an action "normally requiring
environmental assessments [EA]."3 These more preliminary-level
EA's, in turn, are key indicators in determining the necessity for a
full-scale EIS. Where "the environmental assessment demonstrates
that the environmental effects of the action with the United States
may be 'significant,"' the Department of State must perform an
EIS.31 Simply because of their large scale, many cross-border oil
pipelines will, more likely than not, be judged to have potentially
significant effects on environment, thereby triggering the EIS.
An EIS is an extensive report that guarantees federal
government actions and policies comply with both the spirit and
the letter of NEPA. In a sentence, NEPA is the United States' "basic
national charter for protection of the environment . .. establish[ing]
policy, set[ting] goals ... and provid[ing] means ... for carrying out
the policy."31 On the most fundamental level, it requires "Federal
agencies to consider environmental effects that include, among
others, impacts on social, cultural, and economic resources, as well
as natural resources," responsibilities which are largely achieved
through carrying out EIS 's.3 EIS's "provide full and fair discussion of
significant environmental impacts and shall inform decision makers
and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid
or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human
environment."4 0 In general, a draft EIS should be first prepared to
3240 C.F.R. §§ 1500-08 (2012). In fact, the Department of State's interpretive regu-
lations incorporate the CEQ regulations by reference in 22 C.F.R. § 161.1 (2012).
A federal action might take the form of issuance or denial of permits prior to com-
mencement of work on natural resource projects, for example.
3422 C.F.R. § 161.7(a) (2012).
22 C.F.R. § 161.7(c), (c)(1) (2012).
6Id.
322 C.F.R. § 161.8(d).
840 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2012).
3COUNLTCL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, A CITIZEN's GUIDE TO THE NEPA 1 (2007).
4040 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (2012).
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best fulfill the obligations under NEPA Section 102(C).41 lien, the
public is given a period to submit comments,4 after which a revised,
final EIS is prepared, taking into account the public comments.
During the ultimate evaluation, officials will use the finalized EIS as
a major factor to help guide their "national interest" detennination
for permit approval or denial.44
II. THE PROPOSED, STREAMLINED PERMITTING STANDARD FOR
CROss-BORDER OIL PIPELINE PROJECTS AND ITS ADVANTAGES
As introduced in Part I, the new, streamlined standard
comprises three main categories of revisions that distinguish it from
the current standard and minimize the obstacles slowing or blocking
a deserving project's path to obtaining a permit. One category deals
with easing actual substantive regulations; the second category
involves expanding permitting authority beyond the Executive
branch; and the final category limits the first two to only certain
classes of cross-border oil pipeline projects.
A. Modification #1: Creating an Eased, Hybrid Regulatory
Scheme for Cross-Border Oil Pipeline Permitting by
Borrowing Selected Provisions from the Department of
Energy's Power Transmission Line Permitting Standard
To lower substantive regulatory hurdles, two principal
aspects of the current oil pipeline permitting scheme should be
4140 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a) (2012). Meeting NEPA §102(C)'s obligations means that
the EIS must analyze, in detail: "(i) the environmental impact of the proposed ac-
tion, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relation-
ship between local short-term uses of man's enviromnent and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented." 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
4240 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2012).
4340 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b) (2012).
44 See, e.g., Executive Sumary: Keystone XL EIS, supra note 16, at ES-1; supra
note 16 & accompanying text.
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replaced by alternatives from the cross-border power transmission
line permitting procedure. First, the Department of Energy's simpler,
"consistent with the public interest" standard should replace the
current "national interest" standard as the ultimate question around
which a project's approval/denial revolves. Implicated in, and
intertwined with these two "tests" are required consultations that
the both Secretary of Energy and Secretary of State must make
before . approving or denying cross-border projects under their
respective departments' regulatory frameworks. The second major
change-employing the Department of Energy's cross-border
power transmission line consultation approach-will diminish the
excessive number of consultations the Department of State must
currently undertake before approving a cross-border oil pipeline.
Like the Department of State with cross-border oil pipelines,
the Department of Energy is in charge of the permitting process
for cross-border power transmission lines." Accordingly, as per
Executive Order 10485, after receipt of an application, the Secretary
of Energy shall grant a presidential permit, "[u]pon finding [its]
issuance . .. to be consistent with the public interest.""' This is in
contrast to the test applied in oil pipeline permitting regulations,
where the seminal question is whether the issuance of a permit
will "serve the national interest."" Both Secretaries may attach
conditions to a pernit, such "as the public interest may in [the
Secretary's] judgment require.""
The most important reason for changing the determinative
test from "serves the national interest" to "consistent with
the public interest" is the lesser number of factors the "public
interest" test weighs as opposed to its counterpart. Thus, the more
45 E.O. No. 10485 (1953), 18 Fed. Reg. 5397 (Sept. 3, 1953), as amended by
E.O. No. 12038 (1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 4957 (Feb. 3, 1978), http://ww.archives.
gov/ federal-register/codification/executive-order/10485.html;; see also 10 C.F.R.
§§ 205.320-205.329 (codifying the regulations implementing the E.O.).
46E.O. No. 10485, § 1(a)(1) (1953), 18 Fed. Reg. 5397 (Sept. 3, 1953), as amended
by E.O. No. 12038 (1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 4957 (Feb. 3, 1978).
47 Supra note 15 & accompanying text.
48 See E.O. No. 10485, supra note 46, at § 1(a)(3). Compare with E.O. No. 13337;
supra note 18 & accompanying text (Secretary of State can impose conditions on
permits "as the national interest may in the Secretary's judgment require").
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straightforward "public interest" test somewhat restraints the
Secretary's discretion, while still insisting that the cross-border
project qualify as advantageous to the public at large. For example,
under the "public interest" test, the Department of Energy must
weigh only "the potential environmental impacts" of the cross-
border power transmission connection and "the project's impact on
electric reliability,"4 9 but gives the Secretary the ability, if needed,
to consider any other factors that [the Department of Energy] may
find relevant to the public interest.""o Additionally, Executive Order
10485 demands only that the Secretary of Energy consult with the
most essential agencies-the Secretaries of State and Defense-as
these reflect the most serious public interest concerns.5 '
On the contrary, cross-border oil pipeline permitting
regulations direct the Department of State to analyze a myriad of
elements when deciding whether to grant a permit-among the
non-exclusive list of factors are "energy security; environmental,
cultural, and economic impacts; foreign policy; and compliance
with relevant federal regulations."" Moreover, Executive Order
13337 compels the Secretary of State to confer with a surprisingly
large group of federal agencies-Secretaries of Defense, Interior,
Commerce, Transportation, Energy, and Homeland Security, the
Attorney General, and the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency. Because so much discretion is left in the hands
of the Secretary, negative feedback on any of the numerous factors
considered, or disagreement from any of the eight other agency
heads, could unnecessarily-or even illegitimately-lengthen the
permitting process, mire a proposal in regulatory limbo, and/or force
an otherwise-worthy proposal to a grinding halt.54
4 In the cross-border liquid oil pipeline context, this criterion could be referred to
as "energy security."
50 U.S. Department of Energy, FAQ: Presidential Permit, Ti-w NORTMRN PAss EIS
(accessed April 18, 2012), http://www.northernpasseis.us/PermittingProcess/pres-
identialpermit.asp.
' E.O. No. 10485, supra note 46, at § 1(a)(3).
52 Supra note 16 & accompanying text.
* Supra note 11 & accompanying text.
54 Some people, particularly proponents of the Keystone XL pipeline, argue that this
is what happened with the Keystone XL proposal. See, e.g, Lee Ross & William
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This understandably leads to numerous questions. Since
both power transmission lines and liquid oil pipelines are facilities
that transport energy across international borders, why does such
a significant regulatory disparity exist for permitting? Does the
cross-border power transmission line standard not address the most
fundamental concerns that an oil pipeline proposal might generate
as well, without imposing any superfluous conditions? What
additional cultural, economic, or foreign policy implications that
affect international oil pipelines are absent from power transmission
line connections? What purpose does obligatory consultation with
the Secretaries of the Interior, Commerce, Transportation, and
Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and EPA Administrator
serve for a cross-border oil pipeline that is not implicated in a cross-
border power line transmission project?
Indeed, the efficient Department of Energy permitting
scheme already tackles the most critical issues facing potential
cross-border power transmission lines and oil pipelines-namely (1)
conducting effective, ex-ante environmental reviews, (2) verifying
reliability/energy security, and (3) ensuring consistency with the
public interestf' Therefore, the relevant parts of the Department of
Energy regulations should be used as a model to implement a hybrid
permitting blueprint, where the "public interest" test replaces the
"national interest" test and inter-departmental consultation is only
required between the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State.
B. Modification #2: Expansion to Allow Alternate Government
Bodies to Issue Cross-Border Oil Pipeline Permits
Although the hybrid Department of State-Department
of Energy regulatory language is an important element of this
proposed revamp of the current oil pipeline permitting scheme,
LaJeunesse, TransCanada subn its new Keystone XL pipeline plan, FoxNEWS.COM
(April 18, 2012) http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/04/18/exclusive-transcan-
ada-submits-new-keystone-xl-pipeline-plan/ (noting that "State Department of-
ficials told members of Congress that a 2013 approval decision is still feasible,
[because] the reason for the original denial was 'not based on the merits of the
project' ").
Supra note 50.
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the central component of the new, streamlined standard is granting
permitting authority to other branches and levels of government. In
this modified approach, the power to approve or deny permits will
extend beyond the Executive branch to both the Legislative branch
and state governments, thus allowing projects to receive approval
through one of three means.
1. Legislative (Congressional) Approval through Two-
Thirds Majority in Both Houses 6
Before setting out the Congressional approval option, it is
important to remember that cross-border oil pipeline proponents
will still be able to obtain a pennit to commence work through the
Executive branch, as they do today. In fact, the Executive branch
will remain the regulator of "first resort" to whom proposed projects
are initially submitted. However, a revised procedure will take
effect if the Executive branch, whether the Secretary of State or the
President, denies a permit. Under the new, streamlined permitting
model, if both the House of Representatives and the Senate vote by
two-thirds majority" to grant the permit in question, Congress will
be able to override the Executive branch's denial, or "veto."
The justification behind granting, or re-granting as it were (see
infra at 4), the legislature power to make such permitting decisions
is compelling, wide-ranging, and possesses roots that reach back to
the United States Constitution itself. Article I, Section 8 empowers
Congress, and not the Executive, to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations."" This clear and explicit declaration in the chief legal
document of the United States openly indicates that Congressional
6 For an excellent, in-depth discussion on legislative and executive roles in regulat-
ing and permitting cross-border facilities and how the two branches interact and
balance their legal responsibilities in this area, see ADAM VANN, KRISTNA ALEXAN-
DER, VANESSA BURRows & KENNETH THOMAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
PROPOSED KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE: LEGAL ISSUEs 4-12 (2012).
7 This precise number was selected purposefully, as it is identical to the vote needed
to override a presidential veto of legislation. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
8U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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"authority in this field is preeminent."5 9 The Congressional Research
Service (CRS) has noted Robert J. Delahunt's6 observation that:
the power to regulate foreign commerce at the
national level was to be vested in Congress. [ . ]
The debate at the Philadelphia Convention over
whether a bare majority or a supermajority of each
House was required to enact foreign commerce
regulations demonstrates that the Framers intended
such regulation to be made by a legislative body,
rather than an executive or judicial one.6 '
The Executive branch, on the other hand, relies on the
"President's recognized authority in the area of foreign affairs"6
as well as the Executive Orders discussed in Part II. Importantly,
throughout most of its history, the Executive branch has recognized
the Legislative branch's superiority in this field. As the CRS report
demonstrates, a fairly long line of presidential actions on cross-border
facility permitting have shown a substantial degree of deference to
Congress's inherent power in this area. Nevertheless, a trend seems
to have emerged over the years wvhereby the president's power has
slowly grown through the inaction of Congress, the body upon
which the power to regulate foreign commerce had originally been
conferred.63 As late as 1968. when the Johnson administration issued
59VANN ET AL., supra note 56, at 6.
60 Former Special Counsel of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, an
executive department.
6 VANN ET AL., supra note 59, at 6-7, citing Robert J. Delahunt, Federalism Beyond
the Water Edge: State Procurement Sanctions and Foreign Affairs, 37 STAN. J.
INTL L. 1, 25 (2001).
2 Id. at 4. See also U.S. CoNsT. art. II, §§ 2, 3 (stating that the President, with the
consent of the Senate, has the power to make [international] treaties, appoint ambas-
sadors [to foreign countries], and receive ambassadors from other countries).
6 See VANN ET AL., supra note 56, at 7-10. For example, in 1869, President Grant
evinced his deference to the legislature by acquiescing not to oppose a French com-
pany's submarine cable, "'unless Congress otherwise direct[ed]. 'Id. at 7; citing22
Op. Att'y Gen. 13 (1898) (citing Senate Doc. 122, at 70)). Later, in 1897, President
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Executive Order 11423, assigning power to the Executive branch
to issue cross-border oil pipeline permits (and permits for other
cross-border natural resource facilities), the traditional superiority
of Congress in the permitting context was acknowledged. That
document "designate[s]" and "empower[s]" the Secretary of State
to handle permits for cross-border natural resource facilities, among
other things, "to the extent that congressional authorization is not
required. "64 However, by 2004, when Executive Order 13337 was
promulgated, this language had quietly disappeared.6 5
Decisions from the United States federal judiciary also
support Congress's ability to regulate all foreign commerce-
which, by definition, certainly includes cross-border oil pipelines-
by broadly construing the Legislative branch's Commerce Clause66
authority. In the famous 1824 Supreme Court case of Gibbons v
Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, ruled that the
Commerce Clause "comprehend[s] every species of commercial
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. No sort of
trade can be carried on between this country and any other, to which
McKinley refused to consider the same French company's application for a permit
to land an additional undersea cable, because he "did 'not regard himself as clothed,
in the absence of legislative enactment, with the requisite authority to take any ac-
tion upon the application.'" Id., citing 22 Op. Att'y Gen. 13 (1898) (reciting from a
May 11, 1897 letter from the State Department). Another Attorney General opinion,
this time from 1898, maintained that "the President could impose conditions upon
foreign cables, in absence of congressional legislation, and either prevent or permit
the landing of such cables ... Id. at 8. By 1913, the evolution had reached a point
where the Attorney General was implying that "both the President and Congress
have authority to regulate... international commercial transactions," and absent any
contrary Congressional action, the President was free to proceed. Id. at 9 (emphasis
added).
64E.O. No. 11423, supra note 6, at § 1(a) (emphasis added).
E.O. No. 13337, supra note 6, at § 1(a). See also VA-NN ET AL., supra note 56,
at 9-10 (noting that "Executive Order 13337 omitted the qualification 'to the ex-
tent that congressional authorization is not required,' when amending the section in
Executive Order 11423 that empowered the Secretary to receive all such applica-
tions").
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ...
2012-2013] NEW AND IMPROVED ENERGY REALITY 17
this power does not extend.""7 Even in United States v. Bailey where
the Fifth Circuit interpreted the scope of the Commerce Clause more
narrowly,6 8 it still held that "Congress may regulate only commercial
intercourse, so its power is confined to the regulation oftrade, business
transactions, and economic activity."69 Like most cross-border
natural resource projects, a liquid oil pipeline undoubtedly meets
even this tighter definition of commerce, because, as a commodity
(or good) being transported for later distribution and sale, it is a
quintessential example of international trade and economic activity.
It follows, therefore, that the Commerce Clause sanctions Congress
to legislate on the issuance of oil pipeline permits.
In a case more specifically focused on oil pipeline permitting,
the federal district court in Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S.
Department ofState concluded that, for cross-border pipelines:
Under the federal Constitution, then, the authority to
regulate such a project vests in either the legislative
or executive branch of government. Congress has
failed to create a federal regulatory scheme for the
construction of oil pipelines, and has delegated
this authority to the states. Therefore, the President
has the sole authority to allow oil pipeline border
crossings under his inherent constitutional authority
to conduct foreign affairs. 0
Critically, the court accepts that the Legislative branch
shares oil pipeline permitting power with the Executive branch
and clarifies that, by default, the President may exercise exclusive
jurisdiction, but only because Congress did not act in the field With
the unambiguous delegations of authority that the Constitution
7VANN ET AL., supra note 56, at 10-11, citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193-94.
61 The Fifth Circuit explained that despite the broadness of the Supreme Court's
definition as per Gibbons v. Ogden, "the Commerce Clause does not grant the Con-
gress carte blanche." U.S. v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1235 (5th Cir. 1997).
6Id. (emphasis in original).
"VANN ET AL., supra note 56, at 11, citing Oyate v. Clinton, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071,
1081 (D. S.D. 2009).
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provides to Congress, the historical pattern of Executive deference
to Congress with regard to cross-border connections, and favorable
federal judicial precedent on its side, Congress seems more than
justified in inv olving itself in the issuance of cross-border oil pipeline
permits. Thus, an appeal to the Legislative branch for a two-thirds
vote to override Executive branch denial of a permit is a viable part
of the streamlined cross-border oil pipeline regulatory scheme.
2. State-by-State Approval, Unless the Federal
Regulatory Authority Can Affirmatively Prove That
the Overall Proposed Project Is Against the National
Interest
Under the new, streamlined permitting procedure, the third
and final alternative for gaining project approval is to obtain permits
from each state individually, unless the Department of State-the
federal regulator responsible for issuing cross-border permits-can
prove that the proposed project, as a whole, is against the national
interest. Such a diminution of federal administrative pernitting
power and shift in the burden of proof makes sense. After all, the
sole reason that cross-border oil pipelines must receive federal
endorsement is because the project traverses an international border.
Yet, in comparison, an identical pipeline that begins in the northern
reaches of Montana and extends to the Gulf Coast of Texas does
not require a federal permit. The difference in federal oversight and
the difficulty/complexity in obtaining a permit for an international
pipeline as opposed to a domestic pipeline is stark. It also begs the
question why pipelines that extend only a few miles farther, into
Canada or Mexico. should be subjected to more rigorous levels of
scrutiny than their counterparts that stop just inside the border." If
11 In Canada's case, especially, it is difficult to legitimize this discrepancy in level
of scrutiny. As the CRS highlights: "Canada has long been the United States' most
important energy partner. Canada is the single largest foreign supplier of petro-
leum products, natural gas, and electric power to the United States-and the United
States is the dominant consumer of Canada's energy exports. Canada is also the pri-
mary recipient of American energy exports. The value of the energy trade between
the two countries totaled nearly $100 billion in 2010.. .." Companies from America
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interstate oil pipeline siting is not regulated by the federal go overnment
whatsoever, should not siting for international pipelines operate in
the same fashion, only with a final federal verification to ensure that
the proposed projects are not against the national interest?
To be sure, federal legislation has been promulgated
which governs, to various degrees, oil pipeline safety7 as well as
ratemaking," but federal rules and regulations do not control issuance
of permits for domestic location and siting. Instead, the states
themselves generally make permitting decisions for major natural
resource and energy projects like oil pipelines, if they even exercise
this authority at all.75 Without federal govermnent regulation over
oil pipeline siting, "state laws establish the primary authority for oil
pipelines, including interstate oil pipelines."76 Given that state law
controls in all pipeline projects, except those that cross international
borders, the streamlined approach will re-emphasize state authority
and Canada "have become integrated in the development, production, transporta-
tion, and marketing of petroleum and natural gas. Joint ventures between American
and Canadian companies on petroleum and natural gas projects are common. These
close connections, and geographic proximity, have led the American and Canadian
energy markets to be viewed as one." PAL W PARFOMIAK & IICHAEL RATNER, CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Tim U.S.-CANADA ENERGY RELATIONSHIP: JOINED AT
THE WELL 1, 3 (June 17, 2011).
72 PAL PARFoMAK & ADAM VANN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEMORANDUM:
INFORMATION ON FEDE1RAL LAw RELATED TO SITING AND SAFETY OF OIL PIPELINES 2-3
(Sept. 20, 2010), citing Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-129;
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-355).
FERC has regulatory authority over the rates interstate oil pipeline operators set.
Id.
74Id. at 5 (stating plainly that "[t]he federal government does not have siting author-
ity for oil pipelines, even interstate pipelines"). Compare this lack of siting authority
for oil pipelines with the clear responsibility assigned to FERC via the Natural Gas
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) where "parties seeking to construct, acquire or operate gas
pipelines ... i.e. interstate pipelines, must obtain a 'certificate of public convenience
and necessity' from FERC." Id.
See id. (noting that "[i]n the absence of federal government siting authority, state
laws establish the primary siting authority for oil pipelines, including interstate oil
pipelines"). The CRS report also underlines how some states, such as Nebraska,
"do not appear to [have] any permitting requirements that apply specifically to the
construction and operation of oil pipelines." Id.
76 Id.
20 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20
even on cross-border projects by reversing the existing burdens
of proof. If a proposed oil pipeline project complies with all state
regulations, successfully passes the NEPA evaluation, and satisfies
all other relevant state and federal regulations," a prima facie,
rebuttable presumption of pernit approval will fon. This rebuttable
presumption can only be overcome if the State Department, as the
federal regulator, affirmatively proves that granting the permit
would be against the national interest on the whole. Consequently,
if the State Department cannot prove that the project cuts against
the national interest, then its proponents can carry on by seeking
individual permits from each of the states through which the cross-
border pipeline will pass.
Suppose, for instance, that an application for a cross-border
pipeline entering Montana from Saskatchewan, Canada had been
denied by the presidential administration and failed to garner the
two-thirds "override" in both houses of Congress. While pipeline
proponents would still have to fulfill their environmental review
obligations under NEPA and obey all pertinent state and federal
regulations, the pipeline builders could apply to the Montana state
regulatory authorities to seek a permit to construct the portion of the
pipeline that ran through Montana." Thus, if the Montana Public
Service Commission found a project to be in the best interest of
Montanans and chose to issue a permit,79 then a permit would indeed
"For example, the requirement that design and construction standards will meet all
of the criteria imposed by, inter alia, the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Act of 1979 and
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002. Supra note 72 and accompanying text.
" See MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-20-102(4) ("The legislature finds that the construction
of additional . . . pipeline facilities [and other natural resources/energy facilities]
may be necessary to meet the increasing need for electricity, energy, and other prod-
ucts. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that the location, construction, and opera-
tion [of] ... pipeline facilities ... are in compliance with state law and that a[ ] ...
pipeline facility . . . may not be constructed or operated within this state without a
certificate of compliance acquired pursuant to this chapter.")
"Id. at § 75-20-102(1)-(3) (describing the purposes and legislative findings for the
Major Facility Siting Act-factors likely to be weighed when making a permitting
decision, such as "maintain[ing] and improv[ing] a clean and healthful environ-
ment for present and future generations," "prevent[ing] unreasonable depletion and
degradation of natural resources," and balancing Montanans constitutional rights
"to pursue life's basic necessities, to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to acquire,
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be granted and the project could proceed, unless the Department of
State's Office of International Energy and Commodity Policy could
demonstrate that the proposed project, as a whole, went against
the national interest. The Montana Major Facility Siting Actso and
Title 69 ("Public Utilities and Carriers"), Chapter 13 ("Pipeline
Carriers"), of the Montana Code Annotated' would likely act as
primary guidance in the Montana Public Service Commission's
determination on whether to issue a pennit.
The advantages of this state-based, third alternative are
largely obvious. A third method of seeking permitting makes it
more likely that worthy project proposals that have satisfied all state
and federal requirements would actually receive the permits they
deserve. 8 2 The excessively open-ended discretion that enables the
Executive branch to issue or deny cross-border oil pipeline permits
for arbitrary and irrational reasons would end. Combined with the
suggested Legislative branch alternative, it also reduces the threat of
the 1iber-politicization of a decision, since the parties that previously
had exclusive control over granting or blocking a permit would now
know that a proposed project would have multiple opportunities to
gain approval. If a pipeline's proponents have complied with all state
and federal permitting regulations and successfully met the NEPA
requirements, regulators would understand that their decision to
reject an application would need to be founded on solid evidence and
a well-reasoned argument a nebulous or poorly-supported decision
would not . withstand multiple rounds of review. Accordingly, the
assessment procedure and decision would refocus more on the
actual merits for and against the project, rather than insignificant
issues and political games.
possess, and protect property, and to seek safety, health, and happiness in all lawful
ways").
s MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-20-101 et seq. (2011).
"Id. §§ 69-13-101 etseq. (2011).
82 Until superior sources of energy are discovered, policy analysts agree that in-
creased oil importation from Mexico, and particularly Canada, in lieu of importa-
tion from less stable and even outright hostile foreign regimes, is preferable for
American interests (e.g., energy security). See, e.g., PARFoMNiAK & RANER, supra
note 71 at 1 (noting that "[i]ncreased energy trade between the United States and
Canada-a stable, friendly neighbor-is viewed by many as a major contributor to
U.S. energy security").
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C. Modification #3: Limit the Streamlined Standard Presented
Supra Parts ILA-B to Projects That Enter the United
States from Countries with Equivalent or Superior (Stricter)
Regulations in the Fields of Environmental and Natural
Resources Law
The new, streamlined pennitting standard has one major
restriction, which would effectively limit the number of cross-
border natural resources projects" that could be eligible for fast-
tracked approval. It would demand that, to qualify for fast-tracked
approval, the proposed cross-border oil pipeline project must enter
United States territory from a nation84 with equivalent (reasonably
comparable) or superior (stricter) natural resources and environmental
regulations. This article defines "superior" or "stricter" regulations
as those which exceed their American counterparts, in the sense
that the foreign regulations are more protective of the enviromnuent,
promote more sustainable natural resource management, demand
more exacting before-the-fact environental analyses, impose
more stringent conditions for habitat restoration, et cetera. In other
words, "equivalent or superior regulations" means that the country
from which the proposed project will enter the United States has a
permitting scheme and associated regulations that are on par with,
or compare favorably to, the corresponding American regulatory
landscape. If the foreign nation from which the proposed project
originates is judged to have equivalent or superior natural resources
and environmental laws, the streamlined standard should be applied
for permitting for the American sector of the project; if not, then the
current permitting scheme should govern.
"While this section pertains only to oil pipelines, it seems reasonable that a simi-
lar blueprint could be expanded to other cross-border natural resources and energy
projects as well.
84 As it stands today, geographical and technological constraints dictate that this
standard mostly applies to America's northern and southern land neighbors, Canada
and Mexico. However, future advancements in technology could also affect cross-
border facilities and connections with other, more distant countries.
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III. A HYPOTHETICAL CASE STDY ATTEMPTING TO APPLY THE
NEW, STREAMLINED PERMITTING STANDARD: THE KEYSTONE
XL PIPELINE
The Keystone XL pipeline is a proposed oil pipeline project,
sponsored by TransCanada, which is designed to begin near Hardisty,
Alberta, Canada and transport Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin
crude oil from the Athabasca oil sands to Port Arthur, Texas on the
Gulf Coast.1 Keystone XL's capacity would allow it to transport
700,000 barrels of crude oil each day to "delivery points" in both
Oklahoma and on the Texas Gulf Coast.8 6 The 36-inch diameter
pipeline, mostly buried underground, would run approximately
1,711 miles through Alberta, Saskatchewan, Montana, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. TransCanada applied
for a presidential permit in September 2008, prepared multiple
EIS's (with the final version released on August 26, 2011), and
agreed to comply with 57 more stringent "Project-specific Special
Conditions for design, construction, and operation of the Project.""
These "Special Conditions," designed by the Department of State
in conjunction with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), would be instituted as a supplement to
"the existing PHMSA regulatory requirements."8 9 Nonetheless,
Keystone XL has been controversial from its inception,, and its
critics raised concerns about the potential for serious negative
environmental consequences-in particular, the prospect of the
pipeline passing through the Sand Hills region of Nebraska and
over the Ogallala Aquifer, an important water source for the Great
Plains region and western United States.9 0 After evaluation by the
Executive Summary: Keystone XL EIS, supra note 16, at ES-i-E S-4.
6 Id. at ES-1. The daily capacity could be increased to 830,000 "by increasing
pumping capacity at the proposed pump stations." Id. at ES-2.
'I7d. at ES-2, ES-4-ES-5. Approximately 327 miles of pipeline would be located in
Canada, whereas the other 1,384 would be in the United States. Id. at ES-2.
"1Id. at ES-6.
9 Id.
90 Brian Montopoli, Obama denies Keystone XL pipeline permit, CBS NEWS (Jan.
18, 2012), http:// xwww.cbsnews.com8301-503544_162-57361324-503544/obama-
denies-keystone-xl-pipeline-permit/.
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Department of State, the Obama administration followed the State
Department's recommendation and denied the permit as not serving
the national interest.
Admittedly, any attempt to analyze whether Keystone
XL would have been awarded a permit via the new, streamlined
standard's Legislative branch "override" alternative or through its
state-by-state permitting option can be little more than speculation.
Nevertheless, a preliminary92 investigation into whether Canada
has equivalent or superior environmental regulations and natural
resource project permitting procedures can offer a strong indication
as to whether the streamlined standard might apply in the Keystone
XL pipeline's case. By far the most essential aspect of the permitting
process in assessing the overall environmental viability and impact
a large-scale natural resource venture like Keystone XL is the NEPA
analysis.9 4 Also important are the general and technical information
disclosures which are mandatory part of the application package for
any proposed oil pipeline project.95 Accordingly, if it can be proven
that Canada possesses equivalent or superior corresponding rules
and regulations in these areas, then the Keystone XL pipeline likely
deserves to benefit from the streamlined pernitting standard.
A. Similarity in Purposes of the Legislation: NEPA and CEAA
In Canada, the equivalent of the American NEPA is the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act ("CEAA"), assented to
in 1992. The similarities NEPA and CEAA share are striking and
broad-based. Starting at their most elementary levels, the purposes
of NEPA and CEAA are near mirror images of each other.
NEPA, "the Magna Carta of environmental laws" compels
American government entities to "undertake an assessment of the
environmental effects of their proposed actions prior to making
91 Id.
92 Due to space constraints, I do not intend for this to be a full-scale, in-depth com-
parative study at this point.
93 Obviously, in the Keystone XL instance, Canada is the country from where the
cross-border pipeline would enter the United States.
94Supra text accompanying notes 31-44.
95 Supra text accompanying notes 19-30.
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decisions" and identify feasible alternatives so that the agencies
are "informed of the environmental consequences" of the choices
they make.96 To achieve that end, NEPA forces Federal agencies to
weigh the "impacts on social, cultural, and economic resources, as
well as natural resources," among other factors. The Congressional
purpose of NEPA declares the law as "a national policy which will
encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and
his environment . .. [and] promote efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment ... and stimulate the health
and welfare of man."9 8 To accomplish this ambitious goal, NEPA
directs the govermnent to "use all practicable means" in order
to "attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable
and unintended consequences" and "achieve a balance between
population and resource use which will permit high standards of
living and a wide sharing of life's amenities."9 9 Furthermore,
NEPA highly values and encourages public comment from both
organizations and private citizens during the environmental review
and evaluation.100
CEAA emphasizes the same sort of infoned decision-
making as NEPA, where the parties are fully aware of potential
environmental consequences before they make their decision, and
thus, can devise measures to limit any negative impacts. One of the
central objectives of CEAA is to use environmental assessments
so as to "minimize or avoid adverse environmental effects before
they occur; and incorporate environmental factors into decision
making."' Environmental assessments are described as "a process
9 COLTNCEL ON ENVIRONNENTAL QUALITY, A CITIZEN's GUIDE TO NEPA 2, 5 (2007).
97 Id. at 1.
9842 U.S.C. §4321 (2006).
9 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(a) (2006).
1 "40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(d) (2012) ("Federal agencies shall to the fullest extent pos-
sible [. .] Encourage and facilitate public involvement in decisions which affect the
quality of the human environment"); CoUNcIL ON ENVIRONNENTAL QUALITY, Supra
note 95, at 2 (observing that one of the two major purposes of environmental review
is "citizen involvement').
C0 A NADIAN ENvIRONiENTAL ASSESSNENT AGENCY, CANADIAN ENVIRONiENTAL As-
SESSNENT ACT: AN OVERVIEw [§ 1.1] 3 (updated ed. 2011) (2003).
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to predict the environmental effects of proposed initiatives before
they are carried out," recommend ways to "mitigate [possible]
adverse effects," and ascertain if significant, negative environmental
effects will occur "even after the mitigation is implemented." 10 2
Meanwhile, much like NEPA, the statutory language itself stresses
"sustainable development"-the need to strike a balance between
humankind's interests and environmental preservation.0o It describes
CEAA as a means "through which the Government of Canada seeks
to achieve sustainable development by conserving and enhancing
environmental quality and by encouraging and promoting economic
development that conserves and enhances environmental quality."'04
The environmental assessments imposed by CEAA help attain
these objectives by providing "an effective means of integrating
enviromnental factors into planning and decision-making processes
in a manner that promotes sustainable development."' Finally,
like NEPA, public participation and comment is a key aspect of the
enviromnental assessment process.10 6
B. NEPA's and CEAA's Scope, "Qualifying Projects," and Core
Components
Given their overlapping purposes, it is not surprising that
compliance with NEPA and CEAA is necessary for many of the
same types of projects undertaken in the United States and Canada.
In the United States, any "legislation and other major Federal actions
Id. See also R.S.C. 1992 S.C., c. 37, § 4(a) (Can.) (setting out the purposes of
CEAA, such as "ensur[ing] that projects are considered in a careful a careful and
precautionary manner before federal authorities take action in connection with
them, in order to ensure that such projects do not cause significant adverse environ-
mental effects").
1 3See R.S.C. 1992 c. 37, § 4 (Can.) (current as to Mar. 6, 2012) (describing another
key aim of CEAA as "encourage[ing] responsible authorities to take actions that
promote sustainable development and thereby achieve or maintain a healthy envi-
ronment and a healthy economy.").
114 1992 S.C., c. 37, Preamble (Can.) (current as to Mar. 6, 2012).
*Id.
6Id. at § 4(1)(d) (listing one objective of CEAA as "to ensure that there be opportu-
nities for timely and meaningful public participation throughout the environmental
assessment process").
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significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" must
comply with NEPA.'0 As discussed in Part II supra, oil pipeline
projects (like Keystone XL), by their sheer size, scale, and the
geographic area covered, will likely need to prepare a full-scale EIS,
with a much more detailed environmental analysis, and not merely
a shorter, basic EA. 0 ' Likewise in Canada, some projects require
a comprehensive study before work can begin or a permit can be
issued, whereas a simpler screening report will suffice for others. A
comprehensive study is the Canadian equivalent of an EIS, and in
taking more elements into account for its environmental analysis, it is
more all-encompassing and intensive than a screening report, which
is Canada's parallel to an EA.09 In any event, there is no guesswork
involved in determining the level of review that should be applied to
the Canadian sector of the Keystone XL pipeline, because in Canada,
certain classes of projects, including the "proposed construction of
an oil and gas pipeline more than 75 km in length on a new right of
way," alw+ays require that a comprehensive study be completed.'0
With regard to content and substance, most of the legal
obligations and directives at the heart of NEPA are also shared with,
and can be found in, CEAA. NEPA outlines five major points, with
10742 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
"See supra notes 32-37 & accompanying text. As per 22 C.F.R. § 161.7(c)(1)
(2012), EAs are presumptively required for international pipelines, where the De-
partment of State has regulatory jurisdiction, to "provide the basis of the determi-
nation whether an [EIS]" must also be completed. See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3-
1501.4 (2012) (providing, in the model NEPA regulations drafted by the Council
on Environmental Quality, whether an [EA] and/or an [EIS] should be prepared);
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9, § 1508.11 (2012) (defining "environmental assessment" and
" environmental impact statement").
"See R.S.C. 1992 S.C., c. 37, § 2(1) (Can.) (defining "comprehensive study report"
and "screening report").
no Comprehensive Study List Regulations (Canadian Environmental Assessment
Act) SOR/94-638, § 4(14)(a) (Can.) (current as to Mar. 6,2012). For a more general
description of the sweeping, NEPA-like jurisdiction of CEAA and what types of
projects and actions are covered, see R.S.C. 1992 S.C., c. 37, § 5 (Can.) (current as
to Mar. 6, 2012) (prescribing that "[a]n environmental assessment of a project is re-
quired before a federal authority exercises one of the following powers or performs
one of the following duties or functions in respect of a project. . . ." and then listing
criteria).
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a very broad scope, that must be explored in a "detailed statement by
the responsible official" for ventures requiring NEPA compliance:
(a) the enviromnental impact of the proposed action,
(b) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(c) alternatives to the proposed action,
(d) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity, and
(e) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.'
For its part, Canada's CEAA also places very sweeping,
analogous responsibilities on parties completing screening reports
and comprehensive study reports, mandating information on:
(a) the environmental effects of the project, including the
environmental effects of malfunctions or accidents
that may occur in connection with the project and any
cumulative environmental effects that are likely to result
from the project in combination with other projects or
activities that have been or will be carried out;
(b) the significance of the effects referred to in paragraph
(a); [ . ]
(c) measures that are technically and economically
feasible and that would mitigate any significant adverse
environmental effects of the project; and
(d) any other matter relevant ... such as the need for the
project and alternatives to the project, that the responsible
authority ... may require to be considered." 1
In addition, CEAAprovides that the following supplementary
factors must be weighed in a comprehensive study analysis:
"'42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
" R.S.C. 1992 c. 37, § 16(1) (Can.).
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(a) alternative means of carrying out the project that
are technically and economically feasible and the
environmental effects of any such alternative means:
(b) the need for, and the requirements of, any follow-up
[clean-up or restoration] program in respect of the
project; and
(c) the capacity of renewable resources that are likely to be
significantly affected by the project to meet the needs of
the present and those of the future.' 1
Without embarking on an overly simplistic sentence-by-
sentence comparison within this article, a side-by-side reading
of these NEPA and CEAA measures reveals the extent to which
these two laws share legal content. Although the actual language
employed is not entirely identical, the intention of the two laws is
highly compatible and most core CEAA components cited above
can easily be matched up with their NEPA relatives. In short, the
commonalities in the purposes of the two laws and in the classes
of projects to which they apply plainly carry over into the core
substantive statutory language found in NEPA and CEAA, both
of which force government agencies to "take a 'hard look' at
environnental consequences" of a proposed project before making
any decisions.'4 Accordingly, because this preliminary study has
clearly demonstrated that Canada's environmental and natural
resources laws are equivalent or superior to corresponding laws in
the United States, the Keystone XL pipeline likely would qualify for
fast-tracked permitting under the modified, streamlined standard."'
113 Id. at § 16(2).
14Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989), citing
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21 (1976).
"1 However, proposed changes to Canada's Budget 2012 could have an effect on
this conclusion, since the current method of conducting environmental reviews is
due to be "limited [and] simplified." See, e.g., Jason Fekete, Budget: Environmental
Reviews to be limited, simplified, CALGARY HERALD (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.
calgaryherald.com/business/Environmental reviews+limited+simplified/6380913/
story.html.
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CONCLUsIoN
Natural resource project permitting, and particularly oil
pipeline permitting, is probably as complex a topic as it is important,
especially as the United States', and indeed the world's, demand for
energy increases through the 21st century. Many policy analysts have
pointed to the advantages of shifting the United States' energy policy
dynamics by increasing trade with, and imports from, neighbors like
Mexico, and especially Canada.'16 With that in mind, the United
States should modify its current cross-border oil pipeline permitting
scheme"' and adopt a new, streamlined standard that makes for a
smoother pennitting experience for worthy cross-border oil pipeline
(and other natural resource) projects. Again however, only those
projects that enter the United States from a country that already
possesses equivalent or superior environental statutes and natural
resource permitting regulations will be eligible for consideration
for the fast-tracked approval program."' Three key changes to the
current cross-border oil pipeline pennitting scheme would reduce
the immense discretion currently held by the Executive branch,
lessen the over-politicization of decisions that occurs today, and
force regulators to justify with solid and substantial evidence why
a permit goes against the national interest." The first modification
will replace certain unwieldy provisions from the current system
with alternate language from the Department of Energy's efficient
cross-border power transmission line permitting model.o' The
second major alteration allows cross-border oil pipeline proponents
who have been denied a presidential pennit to seek a Congressional
"override" of the Executive branch's rejection.' In the event that
the proposed oil pipeline does not receive a presidential permit and
fails to gain an "override" from both houses of Congress, proponents
can also seek permits from individual states on a case-by-case basis,
"6Supra Part III.C.
117 Supra Part II.
""Supra Part III.C.
"
9Supra Part III.B.2.
Supra Part III.A.
121 Supra Part III.B. 1.
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provided that the Department of State cannot affirmatively prove
that the pipeline, on the whole, is against the national interest.'
Even with this revised cross-border oil pipeline permitting scheme,
it is still impossible to know for certain whether the Keystone XL
project would have been granted a pennit. Hypothetically however,
it seems quite possible that with this more efficient regulatory
structure. Keystone XL could have at least progressed partially, on
a state-by-state basis, perhaps with on-going negotiations regarding
the siting around the Sand Hills region of Nebraska. Such action
would push the United States toward improved energy security, while
simultaneously protecting America's valuable natural resources
and important environmental interests through the continued
requirement of rigorous NEPA review-certainly a compromise that
could benefit all sides.
22 Supra Part III.B.2.

